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BUSINESS LAW
I. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL: "FUNDAMENTAL UNFAIRNESS"
DEFINED
In Sturkie v. Sifly1 the South Carolina Court of Appeals
held that an unsatisfied judgment against a corporation does not
justify piercing the corporate veil unless the plaintiff will suffer
injustice or fundamental unfairness. To prove fundamental un-
fairness, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was
aware of the plaintiff's claim against the corporation and acted
in a self-serving manner with regard to the property of the cor-
poration and in disregard of the plaintiff's claim in the property.
This decision places a difficult burden of proof on a party at-
tempting to pierce the corporate veil.
The controversy in this case concerned the actions of the
respondents, Sifly and Walter, as sole stockholders and officers
of Carolina Furniture. They organized and incorporated Caro-
lina Furniture in January 1976 and hired Jay Ruple as their ex-
clusive sales agent to market tables. The corporation was grossly
undercapitalized from its inception.2 The respondents held no
formal corporate meetings and failed to comply with other cor-
porate formalities. In May 1977, when Carolina Furniture was
operating at a loss,3 the respondents moved inventory worth
$6,000 to $7,000 to a company in North Carolina in which Wal-
ter held a one-half interest. In June 1977 Carolina Furniture
ceased operation.
In August 1977 Ruple obtained a judgment against Carolina
Furniture for unpaid wages and comjmisions and the appellant
receiver was appointed. The appellant receiver instituted this
action to collect the judgment, alleging two causes of action. The
1. 280 S.C. 453, 313 S.E.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1984).
2. Carolina Furniture began with only $5,000 in capital and was in financial trouble
from its beginning. To keep the corporation afloat, Sifly and Walter made personal loans
to Carolina Furniture and later debited its account when funds were available. They
made no record of these transactions. Id. at 455, 313 S.E.2d at 317.
3. In April 1977 Carolina Furniture carried a loss of $265,191 on its Profit and Loss
Statement. Id.
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first was a common-law action to pierce the corporate veil on the
ground that the respondents had conducted the business as if it
were their own. The second was a statutory action under South
Carolina Code section 33-11-240 to recover distributions improp-
erly made to stockholders.4 The court of appeals affirmed the
judge's holding that the receiver was not entitled to hold respon-
dents individually liable for the judgment.5
The court of appeals stated that the party attempting to
pierce the corporate veil has the burden of proving that the doc-
trine should be applied." The court, relying heavily on Dewitt
Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Fleming Fruit Co.,7 adopted a
two-prong test for determining whether to disregard the corpo-
rate entity.8 The first part of the test is an eight-factor analysis
of observance of corporate formalities; the second part requires
that there be an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness.9
The court concluded that the receiver had satisfied the first part
of the test by proving a sufficient number of factors to justify
piercing the corporate veil.'0 The main issue on appeal was
4. The statute provides:
Any shareholder who receives any distribution or payment from a corpora-
tion, whether by dividend, purchase or redemption of shares, by distribution in
liquidation or reduction of capital, or otherwise, either at a time when the cor-
poration is or will thereby be rendered insolvent, or when the shareholder
knows or has reason to know that such distribution or payment is contrary to
Chapters 1 to 25 of this Title or to the articles of incorporation, shall be liable
for the amount of such payment or value of such distribution which is in excess
of the amount or value which could have been paid or distributed without vio-
lation of Chapters 1 to 25 of this Title or of the articles. Such liability shall
inure to and may be enforced by the corporation or by any shareholder suing
derivatively on behalf of the corporation, and by a receiver, liquidator, or trus-
tee in bankruptcy of the corporation.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-11-240 (1976).
5. The receiver appealed the trial court's dismissal of the common law action, but
did not except to dismissal of the statutory cause of action or argue it in his brief. Thus,
he was deemed to have abandoned the issue. 280 S.C. at 460, 313 S.E.2d at 320.
6. Id. at 457, 313 S.E.2d at 318.
7. 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976). In Dewitt the defendant was the sole beneficiary
and president of a corporation that was indebted to the plaintiff-creditor for transporta-
tion charges. The corporation failed to pay the plaintiff, but the defendant stated he
would personally pay the charges. Although the defendant never paid the plaintiff, the
defendant was paying himself annually at least the amount of the plaintiff's charges. The
Fourth Circuit upheld a decision piercing the corporate veil to hold the defendant per-
sonally liable. Id.
8. 280 S.C. at 457-58, 313 S.E.2d at 318.
9. Id.
10. The receiver alleged that Carolina Furniture (1) was undercapitalized; (2) failed
2
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whether the receiver had satisfied the second part of the test by
showing that recognition of the separate identity of the corpora-
tion would result in injustice or fundamental unfairness.11 De-
spite the disregard of corporate formalities, the court reasoned
that an unsatisfied judgment alone does not prove injustice,
fraud, or fundamental unfairness. 2 The court drew a general
rule from Dewitt and Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Sea
Pines Co."5 that requires the plaintiff to prove the defendant's
awareness of the plaintiff's claim at the time the defendant ac-
ted in a self-serving manner and in disregard of the plaintiff's
claim. 14 The court found no evidence that showed the respon-
dents were aware of Ruple's claim for unpaid commissions
before Carolina Furniture ceased operations. 5 The court, thus,
concluded there was no fundamental unfairness to Ruple or the
receiver.16
Sturkie is one of only a few South Carolina court opinions
that address the common-law action of piercing the corporate
veil. 7 This case might have been decided more easily under stat-
to observe corporate formalities; (3) paid no dividends; (4) was insolvent; (5) lacked cor-
porate records; (6) had its corporate funds siphoned off by the dominant stockholder;
and (7) was used as a mere facade for operations of its dominant stockholders. The re-
spondents did not seriously contest these allegations on appeal. Id.
11. Id. at 458, 313 S.E.2d at 318-19.
12. Id. at 458, 313 S.E.2d at 319.
13. 692 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 928, (1983). In Federal De-
posit the Fourth Circuit held that actions of a parent corporation and its insolvent sub-
sidiary, which used its assets for the benefit of the parent, were fundamentally unfair to
the subsidiary's creditors and justified piercing the corporate veil of the parent. The
plaintiff bank loaned $250,000 to a subsidiary of the defendant parent corporation. The
subsidiary corporation, which was- grossly undercapitalized, shared a common board of
directors with its parent. Knowing the subsidiary was insolvent, the directors mortgaged
the only unencumbered piece of property the subsidiary owned for $8,000 and used the
balance to pay debts of the parent corporation. Id.
14. 280 S.C. at 459, 313 S.E.2d at 319.
15. Id. Ruple obtained his judgment in August 1977. The record from Sturkie did
not include Ruple's judgment and did not indicate the basis of the judgment. Ruple did
not testify at trial. Id.
16. Id.
17. The only other modem South Carolina case was Baker v. Equitable Leasing
Corp., 275 S.C. 359, 271 S.E.2d 596 (1980). The court refused to pierce the corporate veil
to subordinate a buyer's interest to that of a creditor of a corporation intermingled with
the corporate seller. The court held that it was not shown the buyer was aware of the
intermingling and thus guilty of fraud or wrongdoing. Id. See also Long v. McGlon, 263
F. Supp. 96 (D.S.C. 1967)(trustee of bankrupt corporation was entitled to bring suit to
impose liability on shareholders, officers, and directors of a corporation because of their
treatment of the corporation.)
3
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utory prohibitions against improper distributions to sharehold-
ers18 or fraudulent conveyances. 19
In viewing the outcome of this case, Ruple's relationship to
the corporation must be considered. As the chief employee of
Carolina Furniture, Ruple was involved in its operation and
would have been aware of the soundness of the corporation. His
judgment for unpaid commissions was an attempt to impose the
corporation's contract liability on the shareholders. 20 Ruple's po-
sition with the corporation distinguishes him from the average
creditor or third party who might attempt to pierce the corpo-
rate veil.
The Sturkie court formulated the test for fundamental un-
fairness in the context of contract liability2 to a third party who
has voluntarily dealt with the corporation. This differs from the
situation in which a corporation incurs tort liability because the
third party tort claimant might not have voluntarily dealt with
the corporation.22 Under the Sturkie test for fundamental un-
fairness the plaintiff may only rely on activities of the corpora-
18. See supra note 4.
19. Under S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-23-10 (1976) any conveyance made to defraud credi-
tors or others of a lawful action is void. Fraudulent intent will be inferred when, under
the circumtances, the conveyance would necessarily hinder and delay creditors. Rogers v.
Marchant, 91 F.2d 660 (1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 739 (1937). It is not necessary that
the creditor have a judgment at the time of the fraudulent transfer, but merely that the
debt exist at the time of the transfer. Matthews v. Montgomery, 193 S.C. 108, 7 S.E.2d
841 (1940). A conveyance made without actual intent to defraud, if without considera-
tion, may be set aside. Gardner v. Kirven, 184 S.C. 37, 191 S.E. 814 (1937).
20. The trial court had questioned "the integrity of Ruple's judgment and his 'clean
hands' with respect to the corporation's financial problems." 280 S.C. at 456, 313 S.E.2d
at 318.
21. The Sturkie court derived its test from Dewitt and Sea Pines, both of which
also involved contract liability. The test was not expressly stated in either of these other
cases, but the Sturkie court formulated a "general rule" that would be consistent with
the outcome of these cases. 280 S.C. at 459, 313 S.E.2d at 319.
22. See Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEx. L. REv. 979 (1971):
In tort cases,... there is usually no element of voluntary dealing, and the
question is whether it is reasonable for businessmen to transfer a risk of loss or
injury to members of the general public through the device of conducting busi-
ness in the name of a corporation that may be marginally financed. The issues
of public policy raised by tort claims bear little relationship to the issues raised
by a contract claim. It is astonishing to find that the fundamental distinction is
only dimly perceived by many courts, which indiscriminately cite and purport
to apply, tort precedents in contract cases and vice versa.
Id. at 984-85.
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tion that occur after his claim arises.2" Therefore, the general
public runs a risk of being injured by an unsound corporation
and having no recourse to piercing the corporate veil. The court
stated it would disregard the corporate form "only where equity
requires the action to assist a third party. ' 24 If confronted with a
case involving tort liability, the court might decide that equity
runs more freely to the tort claimant and formulate a less strin-
gent test for fundamental unfairness in that situation.25
The two-prong analysis adopted in Sturkie creates a divi-
sion of legal and equitable concerns. Proof of injustice or funda-
mental unfairness is distinct from proof of disregard of the cor-
porate form. 26 Although many courts require an element of
fraud, injustice, or fundamental unfairness to pierce the corpo-
rate veil,27 abuse of the corporate privilege, in itself, is sufficient
for some courts to infer injustice or fundamental unfairness. 28 In
Sturkie the separate test for determining fundamental unfair-
ness reflects the court's reluctance to pierce the corporate veil.
Because of the lack of precedent, the court had the opportu-
23. "The burden of proving fundamental unfairness requires that the plaintiff es-
tablish (1) that the defendant was aware of the plaintiff's claim against the corporation,
and (2) thereafter, the defendant acted in a self-serving manner with regard to the prop-
erty of the corporation and in disregard of the plaintiff's claim in the property." 280 S.C.
at 459, 313 S.E.2d at 319.
24. Id. at 458, 313 S.E.2d at 319.
25. There appears to have been no South Carolina case that involved a tort claimant
attempting to pierce the corporate veil.
26. 280 S.C. at 457-58, 313 S.E.2d at 318. The eight-factor analysis of the corporate
form mainly concerns violations of state statutes governing corporations. See S.C. CODE
ANN. Title 33 (1976).
27. See FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 1980); Seymour v.
Hull & Mooreland Eng'g, 605 F.2d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 1979); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mine
Safety Appliances Co., 468 F. Supp. 1132, 1148 (D. Minn. 1979); Burwell v. Reale, 37
Conn. Supp. 501, 505-06, 424 A.2d 656, 658 (1980); Dixon v. Process Corp., 38 Md. App.
644, 382 A.2d 893 (1978); International Aircraft Trading Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co.,
297 N.Y. 285, 292, 79 N.E.2d 249, 252 (1948); Tigrett v. Pointer, 580 S.W.2d 375, 381-82
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
28. See Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. General Prod. Corp., 643 F.2d 413, 418-19 (6th Cir.
1981); Krivo Indus. Sup. Co. v. National Distill. and Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098 (5th
Cir. 1973); U.S. v. Healthwin-Midtown Convalescent Hosp., 511 F. Supp. 416 (C.D. Cal.
1981); Brunswick Corp. v. Waxman, 459 F. Supp. 1222, 1230 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)("Fraud or
wrongful purpose is not a necessary element. For example, a failure to observe corporate
formalities coupled with inadequate capitalization has frequently been cited as a basis
for disregarding the corporate entity and imposing individual liability where such facts
are causally connected with the injury."); Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 641, 364 P.2d 473 (1981).
5
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nity to set a trend in corporate law in South Carolina. Reluc-
tance to pierce the corporate veil might encourage incorporation
within the state. Conversely, requiring strict observance of cor-
porate formalities would have the beneficial effect of upholding
the integrity of the corporate form. The difficult burden of prov-
ing fundamental unfairness, established in Sturkie, should be a
warning to those dealing with an undercapitalized or otherwise
unsound corporation.
William H. Nicholson III
II. MAJORITY MAY FREEZE OUT MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
PROVIDED COMPENSATION Is ADEQUATE
In Dibble v. Sumter Ice and Fuel Co.29 the South Carolina
Court of Appeals held that a corporation's majority shareholders
may "freeze-out" 30 a minority shareholder provided the latter is
adequately compensated for his stock. The court also ruled that
unless the minority shareholder is grossly underpaid for his
stock, he is not entitled to punitive damages.
For several years prior to 1969, E. H. Moses, Jr., and his
brother, D. H. Moses, the two majority shareholders in Sumter
Ice and Fuel Co.,"' attempted unsuccessfully to retire ten shares
of the company's stock owned by Wortham W. Dibble.3 2 Having
failed to obtain Dibble's shares, the corporation's board of direc-
tors voted to dissolve the corporation and to distribute the as-
sets pro rata to the shareholders.3 The majority shareholders
29. 283 S.C. 278, 322 S.E.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, No. 0290 (S.C. Supr.
Ct. filed March 23, 1985).
30. "Freeze-out" occurs when majority shareholders dissolve a corporation, force mi-
nority shareholders out, and continue the same business without allowing the minority
shareholders to participate. See Kellogg v. Georgia-Pacific Paper Corp., 227 F. Supp.
719, 724 (W.D. Ark. 1964).
31. Sumter Ice and Fuel Company, a Sumter, South Carolina corportion, was en-
gaged in the manufacture of ice and the sale of coal and fuel oil. It also operated a
heating and air conditioning business, a filter business, and, at one time, a Royal Crown
Cola Bottling Company. In addition, it owned 48,840 shares of $1.40 convertible pre-
ferred stock in Georgia-Pacific Corporation. Of the company's 648 outstanding shares,
the Moses brothers owned the overwhelming majority and Dibble owned 10. Record at 1,
2.
32. Id. Charles L. Dibble, the assignee of W. W. Dibble, was substituted as Plaintiff-
Respondent. Id.
33. Record at 2. A corporation may be dissolved by shareholder approval of a direc-
[Vol. 37
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were to retain the "going concern" of the business, which in-
cluded real estate, plant, equipment, and accounts receivable.
The minority shareholders were to receive a part of the nonoper-
ating portion of the business, which consisted of convertible pre-
ferred stock in Georgia-Pacific Corporation.
A meeting of the shareholders was called, and the majority
stockholders voted to adopt the resolution of the directors re-
garding dissolution and distribution of assets.34 Following the
plan adopted for distribution of assets, the corporation delivered
Georgia-Pacific shares and cash to Dibble.3"
After the dissolution the Moses brothers continued to oper-
ate the business. They announced in a local newspaper adver-
tisement that effective May 1, 1969, the name of the Sumter Ice
and Fuel Company would be changed to SIFCO Industries and
its legal mode of operation would be changed from a corporation
to a partnership. The advertisement also stated that "[t]here
has been no change in personnel or character of business
conduct."' 6
Dibble brought suit against Sumter Ice and Fuel Company,
charging that the minority stockholders had been frozen out of
the company and that the value of the Georgia-Pacific stock did
not adequately reflect the value of his stock in Sumter Ice and
Fuel Company because the appraisal of the business assets did
not include the corporation's goodwill. Dibble's amended com-
plaint requested the following relief: (1) that Sumter Ice and
Fuel be reassembled and the articles of dissolution cancelled; (2)
a complete accounting of the corporation for the previous five
years be ordered; and (3) that the liquidating trustees be
tors' resolution recommending dissolution. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-21-20 (1976) (formerly
S.C. CODE ANN. 12-22.2 (Supp. 1975)).
34. Record at 2. The shareholders were notified of the time and date of the meeting
in accordance with the requirements of S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-21-20(3)(Supp. 1983)(for-
merly S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-22.2(3)(Supp. 1975)). Dibble, however, maintained that the
place of the meeting was not disclosed and his representative was, therefore, unable to
attend. Record at 169-70. Of the 648 shares of stock outstanding, 628 shares were repre-
sented at the meeting and were voted unanimously for dissolution. Record at 2.
35. Record at 15. The corporation delivered to Dibble 800 shares of $1.40 converti-
ble preferred stock of Georgia-Pacific Corporation. Dibble retained 748 and remitted 52.
On September 15, 1969, the corporation delivered 123 additional shares of Georgia-Pa-
cific stock, all of which Dibble returned four days later. On December 30, 1969, the cor-
poration sent a final distribution check for $255.57, which Dibble also returned. Id.
36. Id. at 16. The referee noted this advertisement as evidence of goodwill in the
continuing business. Id. at 187.
1985]
7
et al.: Business Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1985
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEw [Vol. 37
charged with wilful conversion of corporate assets. Sumter Ice
and Fuel Company's defense was that it had fully complied with
the state's Business Corporation Act allowing voluntary
dissolution. 7
Circuit Court Judge J. B. Ness ruled that a freeze-out had
occurred and that the attempted distribution of assets was not
equitable since the corporation had continued functioning as a
going concern. The partnership was thus bound to compensate
the shareholders of the dissolved corporation for all its assets,
including goodwill. 8 Judge Ness stated that Dibble was entitled
to an accounting and referred the matter to a referee to deter-
mine the value of goodwill and the physical assets of the
corporation. 9
The special referee found that the plaintiff, although
"squeezed out," had not sustained any substantial damages.40
The referee used two methods in valuing the assets of Sumter
Ice and Fuel: the net asset value method, 41 which neither consid-
ered goodwill nor acknowledged Sumter Ice and Fuel as a going
concern, and the capitalization of earnings method,42 which in-
37. Id. at 9-13. See supra note 33.
38. Id. at 16-17. Circuit Court Judge J.B. Ness determined that there had been a
mere transfer of assets and stated: "'However proper a plan [of dissolution] may be
legally, a majority stockholder cannot, under its color, appropriate a business belonging
to a corporation to the detriment of a minority stockholder.'" Record at 19 (quoting
Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1942)).
39. Record at 24. Judge Ness ruled that Dibble's claim was based on equity and
instructed the referee to consider the transfer of assets to the partnership as a sale of the
business and to determine the value accordingly. Id. Dibble's complaint was based on
law and equity. In his petition for a writ of certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme
Court, filed Nov. 26, 1984, Dibble asserted that because the defendant did not compel an
election of remedies, pursuant to Circuit Court Rule 78, when the case was before Judge
Ness, the suit continued to be based on both law and equity. Rule 78 provides: "No
motion to require the plaintiff to elect as to which cause of action alleged in the com-
plaint he will rely on shall be made, unless previous notice thereof in writing, stating the
grounds, is given not less than four days before the hearing." S.C. Cm. CT. R. 78 (1976).
40. Record at 191.
41. Net asset value depends on the real worth of the corporate assets as determined
by physical appraisals, accurate inventories, and allowances for depreciation and obsoles-
cence. The weight given to corporate assets depends on many considerations, including
the nature of the business. Among the items of value that may determine corporate as-
sets are goodwill, book value, and the liquidating value of the stock. Annot., 48 A.L.R.3n
430, 436 (1973).
42. Capitalization of earnings reflects the earning capacity of the corporation and
attempts to predict its future income based primarily on its previous earnings record.
Earnings value is usually determined by computing average earnings during the few
8
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cluded goodwill and the potential earnings of Sumter Ice and
Fuel.43 The accounting of the assets revealed that Dibble was
entitled to $5,552.83 more than the amount he had received
from Sumter Ice and Fuel.44 The referee found that because
there was no evidence of fraud or conversion, Dibble was not
entitled to punitive damages. Dibble received interest on his
award from the date of liquidation and court costs. Both parties
excepted to the referee's decision.
A second circuit court found that the special referee had
erred in applying the net asset valuation method because it did
not include goodwill or future earnings potential. Special Circuit
Judge John W. Harte, Jr., applied only the capitalization of
earnings method and awarded Dibble $16,640.30 more than what
he had received at dissolution.46 The court held that the fiduci-
ary duty owed to the plaintiff had been violated because the dis-
solution served no business purpose other than a selfish one on
the part of the majority shareholders. 46 Dibble was also awarded
$100,000 in punitive damages. The court found that the freeze-
out of the plaintiff by the majority shareholders in dereliction of
their fiduciary duty was misconduct equivalent to conversion.4
7
The South Carolina Court of Appeals rejected Judge
Harte's analysis and adopted the referee's original findings. The
court held that Dibble was not entitled to recover punitive dam-
ages because the suit was based on equity and not law.4s The
court further reasoned that the facts did not warrant punitive
years preceding the corporate change and applying to it a multiplier, which is deter-
mined by the effect of business conditions. Id. at 437.
43. The special referee added sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the net asset value
of Sumter Ice and Fuel to thirty-three and one-third percent of its capitalization of earn-
ings value to determine the total value of the corporation, producing the following
results:
Net Asset Value: $2,004,390 ($3,066,891 x 662/3 %)
Capitalization of Earnings: $1,381,719 ($4,145,572 x 331/ %)
Total Value: $3,426,109
Record at 188, 192.
44. Dibble's 1.543% interest was valued at $52,881, which was $5,552.83 more than
he had received from the dissolution. Id. at 188.
45. Record at 206.
46. Id. The court stated that the purported liquidation was a sham because the bus-
iness continued under the control of the individuals who had been the majority share-
holders prior to liquidation.
47. Id. at 206-07.
48. 283 S.C. at 286, 322 S.E.2d at 679. See supra note 39.
1985]
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damages and agreed with Judge Harte that nothing will prevent
a dissolution or freeze-out of minority shareholders as long as
adequate compensation is paid. The court concluded that Dibble
could receive punitive damages only if he had been grossly
undercompensated."
The court reasoned that because the Georgia-Pacific stock
constituted eighty-three percent of the net asset value of Sumter
Ice and Fuel, the corporation was essentially an investment com-
pany and not a business principally engaged in selling products
and services.50 The court thus concluded that the special referee
was correct in attributing sixty-six and two-third percent of the
corporation's value to its net asset value and thirty-three and
one-third percent to its capitalization of earnings value.51
The court of appeals also reversed the award of attorney's
fees because the action was based in equity and was not pre-
mised upon a statute under which attorney's fees could be recov-
ered.52 The court observed that absent statutory or contractual
49. Id. at 287, 322 S.E.2d at 678-79. The court relied on Metromont Materials Corp.
v. Pennell, 270 S.C. 9, 239 S.E.2d 753 (1977), and Santee Oil Co. v. Cox, 265 S.C. 270, 217
S.E.2d 789 (1975). Both these cases cited Phelps v. Watson-Stillman Co., 365 Mo. 1124,
293 S.W. 429 (1956) in holding that the "fair value" of a dissenting shareholder's stock
means its intrinsic value, to be computed by establishing the fair market value of the
corporate property as an established concern. The major factors in determining fair
value are the net asset value, market value, and earnings value. Santee Oil indicates that
a variety of subfactors are involved in each of the major factors: "[V]arious factors which
all agree should be considered in valuing the common stock ... [are]: The nature of the
enterprise, i.e., a regulated closed-end investment company; leverage; discount; net asset
value; market value; management; earnings and dividends; expenses of operation; partic-
ular stockholdings in ... portfolio; and ... tax situation." 265 S.C. at 274, 217 S.E.2d
at 792 (citing Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71 (1950)). In
Metromont the court, dealing with a closely held family corporation whose assets con-
sisted primarily of real estate, applied the greatest weight to net asset value, rather than
earnings value. In Santee Oil the court evaluated a closely held oil jobbership, which also
held real estate, and assigned a 70% net asset value weight, a 15% market value weight,
and a 15% capitalization weight.
50. 283 S.C. at 284-85, 322 S.E.2d at 678.
51. Id. at 285, 322 S.E.2d at 678-79. The court reasoned that the Georgia-Pacific
stock was considered a nonoperating asset and was not dependent on the "on-going"
business concept for part of its value. See Worthen v. United States, 192 F. Supp 727,
730 (D. Mass. 1961).
52. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 33-11-270(i)(4) (Supp. 1984) provides that dissenting share-
holders to corporate actions involving merger or exchanges are entitled to compensation
for costs and expenses of any proceedings to establish the fair value of their shares. The
court has discretion in awarding expenses, including attorney's and expert's fees, if the
determined fair value of the shares materially exceeds the amount the corporation has
paid to the dissenting shareholder.
10
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provisions, Dibble was not entitled to attorney's fees unless he
fell within the narrow category of plaintiffs for whom equity al-
lows them. 3
Finally, the court denied Dibble interest on his claim be-
cause interest is not recoverable on an unliquidated claim unless
authorized by agreement or statute.54 Because the amount of
Dibble's claim was not capable of being reduced to a certainty,
the court determined that Dibble's claim was unliquidated and
reversed the trial court's award of prejudgment interest.
Minority shareholders who have been frozen out of a corpo-
ration by the majority shareholders have traditionally sought eq-
uitable relief.55 When procedures have been faulty or compensa-
tion inadequate, courts of equity have granted either injunctive
relief or damages based on the fair value of their stock. In
cases in which minority shareholders have sued to recover dam-
ages, courts have determined that, at the very least, these share-
holders are entitled to a fair value of their stock, determined
impartially, and should not be required to accept a value fixed
by the majority shareholders. 7 The court of appeals accepted
this principle, but further conceded "'there is nothing to pre-
vent a dissolution or freeze-out so long as adequate compensa-
tion is paid.' ",58 The court observed, however, that gross un-
derpayment to a minority shareholder might amount to a breach
of fiduciary duty giving rise to a claim for punitive damages.
Dibble affirms that in South Carolina majority shareholders may
use the voluntary dissolution statutes to freeze out minority
53. The exception permits a court of equity to grant attorney's fees to a party who,
at his own expense, successfully maintains or defends an action for the recovery or pres-
ervation of a fund or property in which others are entitled to share. Caughman v.
Caughman, 247 S.C. 104, 146 S.E.2d 93 (1965).
54. See Llewelyn v. Dobson Bros., 274 S.C. 177, 262 S.E.2d 726 (1980).
55. See, e.g., Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941); Kellogg v.
Georgia-Pacific Paper Corp., 227 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Ark. 1964); Allied Chem. & Dye
Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 120 A. 486 (1923); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh
Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919); Theis v. Spokane Falls Gaslight Co., 34
Wash. 23, 74 P. 1004 (1904).
56. See generally F. O'NEAL & J. DERWIN, ExPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BusiNEss
AssociATEs 81-82 (1961); Hornstein, Voluntary Dissolution-A New Development in In-
tercorporate Abuse, 51 YALE L.J. 64 (1941).
57. Accord, Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 82 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1936); Kellogg v. Geor-
gia-Pacific Paper Corp., 227 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Ark. 1964).
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shareholders even if the majority shareholders continue to oper-
ate a portion of the dissolved corporation as a going concern.
Courts in other jurisdictions have viewed the freeze-out of
minority shareholders less favorably. They have enjoined disso-
lutions or mergers when the sole purpose is to freeze out a mi-
nority shareholder. 59 Moreover, compliance with dissolution or
merger statutes has not prevented some courts from finding that
the transaction was a "device, scheme and artifice" to defraud
the minority shareholder of his property.60 This has been espe-
cially true when the majority shareholders continued to operate
the business of the dissolved corporation.6'
The court of appeals was correct in stating that punitive
damages are not recoverable in an equitable claim.62 Neverthe-
less, the court completely ignored Dibble's legal claim for con-
version. 3 It is unclear on what basis the court decided the claim
was solely equitable. Although Judge Ness' order characterized
the suit as an "equitable action, 6 4 the court of appeals stated
that the order did not preclude the award of punitive damages.65
In this respect the Dibble decision appears contradictory. Puni-
tive damages could have been awarded if Dibble had elected a
legal remedy and the court of appeals had characterized the dis-
solution as a sham to defraud Dibble of his equitable rights in
Sumter Ice and Fuel or considered the price paid for his stock so
inadequate as to constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. The
Fourth Circuit has stated that a minority shareholder may re-
ceive either an accounting in equity or actual and punitive dam-
ages at law when the shareholder's equitable rights in a corpora-
tion have been violated. 6
Had Sumter Ice and Fuel been sold outright, all sharehold-
ers would have received the same value for their shares. If the
court of appeals had characterized the transfer of assets from
59. See Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974); Allied Chemical
& Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 120 A. 486 (1923); Kavanaugh v. Kava-
naugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919).
60. See Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974).
61. See Theis v. Spokane Falls Gaslight Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 P. 1004 (1904).
62. See McLeod v. Stevens, 617 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1980).
63. Record at 207.
64. Record at 14.
65. 283 S.C. at 282, 322 S.E.2d at 677.
66. McLeod v. Stevens, 617 F.2d 1038, 1041 (4th Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 37
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Sumter Ice and Fuel to SIFCO as a sale of the business, as did
Judge Ness, 7 the assets of the dissolved corporation could have
been evaluated entirely as a going concern. By valuing part of
Sumter Ice and Fuel under the net asset method, which disal-
lowed the company's value as a going concern, the court short-
changed Dibble. The actual damages to which Dibble was enti-
tled should have been the difference between what he was paid
by the majority shareholders and what the stock of Sumter Ice
and Fuel was really worth as a going concern. 8 Although the
court arguably included goodwill in the capitalization of earn-
ings valuation, the capitalization of earnings was given only a
thirty-three and one-third percent weight in determining the to-
tal value of the company. As Judge Harte's Order noted, "One
cannot combine a value which does not include all of the assets
[net asset value] with a value which does [capitalization of earn-
ings] and achieve a fair and just result.
6 9
The Dibble decision holds that in South Carolina majority
shareholders may force a minority shareholder out of a corpora-
tion by paying adequate compensation for his shares. Absent
gross underpayment for the value of the shares, the minority
shareholder will not be entitled to punitive damages.
Inez Moore Tenenbaum
III. INTEREST IN PROFITS Is A "SECURITY" UNDER SOUTH
CAROLINA UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT
In McGaha v. Mosley"0 the South Carolina Court of Appeals
held that a written assignment of an interest in the profits of a
franchise agreement is a "security" within the meaning of sec-
tion 35-1-20(12) of the South Carolina Uniform Securities Act
(the Act) .7 This holding enforces the preexisting rule that an
67. Record at 24.
68. See Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941). In Lebold the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that minority shareholders can recover the
difference between what they have received from the sale of the physical assets and what
the shares were really worth as stock in a going prosperous business.
69. Record at 204.
70. 283 S.C. 268, 322 S.E.2d 461 (Ct. App. 1984).
71. Id. at 273, 322 S.E.2d at 464. The South Carolina Uniform Securities Act is set
forth in S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-10 to -1590 (1976 & Supp. 1983). The court's holding
1985]
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instrument will be considered a "security" as a matter of law if
on its face it conforms to the name or description found in the
appropriate securities statute. 2
The dispute in this case arose when defendants Mosely and
Whiteside asked plaintiff McGaha, their part-time receptionist,
to invest her savings in Southeastern Energy Systems, Inc.7 3 Af-
ter defendants explained to plaintiff that Southeastern would go
out of business unless it obtained immediate financing, they told
her that she could have ten percent of Southeastern's "stock" in
exchange for an investment in the company.74 McGaha then
withdrew $8,000 from her savings account to invest in South-
eastern. A written agreement stipulated that plaintiff was to re-
ceive ten percent of the net profits realized through Southeast-
ern's efforts in marketing Energymizer Systems.75  The
corporation went out of business shortly thereafter, and Mrs.
McGaha was unable to obtain a refund of her money from
defendants.
McGaha sued alleging common-law fraud and a violation of
the South Carolina Uniform Securities Act.76 The trial court di-
rected a verdict for defendants on the fraud claim. The jury re-
turned a verdict in favor of McGaha on the statutory claim,
that McGaha's interest was a "security" under the Act left the jury free to consider
whether to hold defendants liable under § 35-1-1490 for selling the plaintiff a "security"
by means of a material misstatement or omission to state a material fact. In addition, §
35-1-1500 imposes liability on every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller of
securities and on every partner, officer, or director of such seller to the same extent as
the seller under § 35-1-1490.
72. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 339 (1967). See, e.g., SEC v. C. M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
73. 283 S.C. at 272, 322 S.E.2d at 463. Southeastern Energy Systems, Inc. was or-
ganized in early 1978 to market the "energymizer," a device intended to reduce the con-
sumption of electricity. Defendant Whiteside was the sole incorporator, president, and
50% shareholder of Southeastern. Defendant Mosley owned the remaining 50% of
Southeastern's stock and managed its business. The plaintiff, Mrs. McGaha, had no
management responsibilities at Southeastern. After incorporation Southeastern entered
into a franchise agreement with Energymizer Systems of America, Inc. (Energymizer) for
the exclusive right to sell "energymizers" in certain South Carolina counties. One clause
of this agreement relevant to McGaha's complaint prohibited Southeastern from as-
signing its stock without the written consent of Energymizer. Id. at 271-72, 322 S.E.2d at
463.
74. Id. at 272, 322 S.E.2d at 463. On June 11, 1978, Southeastern obtained the writ-
ten consent of its franchisor, Energymizer, to assign up to 49% of its "stock" in the
franchise. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. See supra note 2.
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which the court of appeals affirmed.7 7
In rejecting defendants' claim that the written assignment
of an interest in Southeastern's profits was not a "security"
under the South Carolina Uniform Securities Act,78 the court
cited section 35-1-20(12) of the Act: "'Security' means any...
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, . . . [any] investment contract, . . . or, in general,
any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security.' ",7e
Since no prior South Carolina state court had interpreted the
meaning of "security" under the Act,80 the court looked for au-
thority interpreting the federal securities statutes.81 The court of
appeals, paraphrasing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 2 stated that "[a]n
instrument may be included within any of the Act's definitions
of a 'security,' if on its face it answers to the name or description
contained therein." 83 The court concluded that the written as-
signment of an "interest" in the "profits" under Southeastern's
franchise agreement was a "security" under section 35-1-20(12)
since "it was on its face a 'certificate of interest or participation
in [a] profit-sharing agreement,' which the Act defines as a
'security.' -184
The decision in McGaha is consistent with the well-settled
rule that "security" should be broadly construed under the se-
curities laws to protect investors' interests. In SEC v. W. J.
77. Id. at 271, 322 S.E.2d at 463.
78. Id. at 273, 322 S.E.2d at 464.
79. Id. (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-20(12)(1976 & Supp. 1983))(emphasis added).
80. In 1982 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a South Carolina federal
district court decision which held that limited partnership interests were "securities"
within the meaning of § 35-1-20(12) of the South Carolina Uniform Securities Act. Plain-
tiff had invested money in two ventures, but left all management responsibilities to the
three general partners. Kosnoski v. Bruce, 669 F.2d 944 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
832 (1982).
81. 281 S.C. at 273, 322 S.E.2d at 464. Bradley v. Hullander, 272 S.C. 6, 21, 249
S.E.2d 486, 494 (1978), observed that South Carolina courts should look to the federal
statutes in interpreting the Act. The definition of "security" in § 35-1-20(12) is almost
identical to those found in the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1)(1976), and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(2)(10)(1976). See also Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. Glenn
W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); Rochkind
v. Reynolds Sec. Inc., 388 F. Supp. 254 (D. Md. 1975).
82. 389 U.S. at 339.
83. 283 S.C. at 273, 322 S.E.2d at 464. See, e.g., SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
84. 283 S.C. at 273, 322 S.E.2d at 464.
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Howey Co.8  the United States Supreme Court stated that the
term "'security' embodies a flexible rather than a static princi-
ple, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and
variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the
money of others on the promise of profits." The securities laws
characteristically define the term "security" to include not only
instruments commonly thought of as securities, such as stocks
and bonds, but essentially all forms of capital investment.8 6 One
court has stated that the term "security" is ordinarily used as a
synonym for "investment" and that "the term is broad enough
to include any form of instrument used for the purpose of fi-
nancing and promoting enterprises, and which is designed for
investment.
'87
The definition of "security" found in section 35-1-20(12) of
the South Carolina Uniform Securities Act is also very broad,
covering almost every conceivable investment scheme. Although
the court of appeals relied primarily on that part of section 35-1-
20(12) which defines "security" as a "certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement,"'8 there is little
doubt that McGaha's interest would also have fallen under the
broader, closely-related heading of an "investment contract,"
also a "security" under section 35-1-20(12).
The classic definition of an "investment contract" is found
in Howey, in which the Supreme Court held that an "investment
contract" would be found under the federal law when "a scheme
involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with
profits to come solely from the efforts of others."8 9 McGaha
85. 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1945).
86. See generally 69 Am JuP. 2D Securities Regulation-State§§ 26-28 (1973); 79
C.J.S. Securities Regulation §§ 201-04 (Supp. 1974).
87. Holloway v. Thompson, 112 Ind. App. 229, 239, 42 N.E.2d 421, 425 (1942).
88. The phrase "certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree-
ment" seems amply inclusive to embrace the agreement in McGaha. See, e.g., S.E.C. v.
Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex. 1961)(written agreement giving lender a percent-
age interest in the profits derived from defendants' mining operations is a "security"
because it is a "certificate of interest or participation in a profit-sharing agreement");
United States v. Davis, 40 F. Supp. 246 (N.D. Ill. 1941)(a certificate stating that a person
is entitled to participate in the distribution of certain profits of an association is a "se-
curity" under the Securities Act of 1933).
89. 328 U.S. at 301. Despite the use of the word "solely" by the Supreme Court in
Howey, the court in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973), held that the real test is "whether the efforts made by those
other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial
[Vol. 37
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never had any significant management responsibilities at South-
eastern and invested her $8,000 in Southeastern with the goal of
receiving profits through the management efforts of defendants.
Under the Howey test, therefore, McGaha's interest in the prof-
its of Southeastern falls squarely within the definition of an "in-
vestment contract" and is, thus, a "security." 90
In conclusion, whether plaintiff's interest in Southeastern is
termed "a certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement" or an "investment contract," McGaha is just
the type of passive investor that the securities laws-both fed-
eral and state-are designed to protect. The court of appeals'
decision in McGaha v. Mosely should give notice to all potential
investors and investment-seeking enterprises that the South
Carolina courts will consider as "securities," subject to the
South Carolina Uniform Securities Act, any interest that falls
within the broad definition of "security" found in section 35-1-
20(12) of the South Carolina Code.
Ellisa Catherine Huguley
efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise." Id. at 482.
90. The cases cited by the court of appeals also support an investment contract the-
ory. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967)(capital shares were "investment con-
tracts" within the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 since investors depended on the man-
agement of others for their profits); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973)(self-improvement contracts that offered buyers
the opportunity to earn commissions on the sale of contracts to others were "investment
contracts" and, thus, "securities" under the federal securities laws, even though buyers
were obliged to contribute their own efforts in finding other prospective buyers);
Rochkind v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 254 (D. Md. 1975)(commodities contracts
bought in reliance on the skill of the broker to make profits were "securities" under the
federal securities laws); SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex. 1961)(oral agree-
ments stating that defendants would give lenders and nonsalaried workers a percentage
interest in profits derived from defendants' mining operations were "securities" within
the Securities Act of 1933). Cf. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551
(1979)(employee's participation in a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan was not
an "investment contract" because the employee's contribution was insignificant and the
employee's primary purpose in selling his labor was to make a living, not to make an
investment).
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IV. FRAUD AND LIABILITY UNDER THE SOUTH CAROLINA UNFAIR
TRADE PRACTICES ACT
In State ex rel. McLeod v. C & L Corp.9 1 the South Carolina
Court of Appeals broadened South Carolina's business law in
two respects. First, conduct that was not previously actionable
under common law was made unlawful under the South Carolina
Unfair Trade Practices Act92 (UTPA).9 3 Second, not only the
corporation but also its controlling persons9 4 may be liable for a
corporate violation of the UTPA 5 Although the court held that
the UTPA "creates new substantive rights"96 by expanding ac-
tionable conduct, it declined to delineate the perimeters of these
rights. The court did draw one clear line, however, by dispensing
with the necessity of proving common-law fraud97 to establish a
violation of the UTPA.
91. 280 S.C. 519, 313 S.E.2d 334 (Ct. App. 1984).
92. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-10 to -160 (1976 & Supp. 1980). The UTPA, passed in
1971, prohibits "[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices in the conduct of any trade or commerce. . . ." The Attorney General or a private
plaintiff may bring suit under the UTPA. Additionally, the Attorney General may au-
thorize solicitors of each judicial circuit and county and city attorneys to bring state
action. The state may seek injunctions, restitution, civil penalties, and dissolution, sus-
pension, or forfeiture of the franchise or corporate charter. See generally Day, The
South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act: Sleeping Giant or Illusive Panacea? 33
S.C.L. REV. 480 (1982).
93. 280 S.C. at 525, 313 S.E.2d at 338.
94. A "controlling person" is "one who formulates and directs corporate policy or
who is deeply involved in the important business affairs of the corporation." Id. at 531,
313 S.E.2d at 341.
95. Id. Additionally, the court affirmed the circuit court's finding that Wayne
Cooper acted as agent of C & L, based on his appointment by C & L to enter into sales
contracts binding between C & L and third parties. Id. at 526, 313 S.E.2d at 338. The
court also found that testimony given to establish the agency relationship was properly
admitted or was harmless error. Id. at 527, 313 S.E.2d at 339. Finally, the court upheld
the trial court's finding that C & L and Wayne Cooper were liable as principals for the
misrepresentations of the salesmen and affirmed the fine against them. Id. at 527-29, 313
S.E.2d at 339-40.
96. Id. at 525, 313 S.E.2d at 338.
97. In South Carolina the following nine distinct elements must be proved to sustain
an action of fraud: "(1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) either
knowledge of its falsity or a reckless disregard of its truth or falsity; (5) intent that the
representation be acted upon; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) the hearer's
reliance on its truth; (8) the hearer's right to rely thereon; (9) the hearer's consequent
and proximate injury." R. MCCULLOUGH, A GUIDE TO SOUTH CAROLINA ToRTs 41-42
(1981). See, eg., McKay v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 199 S.C. 335, 341, 19 S.E.2d 457, 459
(1942).
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L. G. Funderburk and W. L. Cooper, Jr., officers and sole
shareholders, formed C & L Corp., Inc. (C & L) to develop and
sell a real estate subdivision. Wayne Cooper, W. L. Cooper's
brother, conceived the project and contracted with C & L to lay
out the subdivision, sell the lots by installment purchase con-
tracts, and make all collections on the installment contracts for
a commission. To induce purchases of the lots, sales agents em-
ployed by Wayne Cooper made false representations concerning
the following planned improvements: paved roads, drainage,
streetlights, sewage, city water, access roads, and school bus
routes.9
8
The issue in this case was not the existence of deceptive and
unfair trade practices: both the special referee and the circuit
court found that C & L and Wayne Cooper engaged in unfair
acts.9 These misrepresentations led to the Attorney General's
action under the UTPA against C & L; L. G. Funderburk and
W. L. Cooper, its officers; and Wayne Cooper, its alleged agent.
The court,100 acting on cross appeals, affirmed the judgment
against C & L1° 1 and Wayne Cooper, but reversed the summary
judgment order dismissing Funderburk and W. L. Cooper and
remanded for trial the issue of whether they were controlling
persons of C & L.
In holding that the common-law elements of fraud need not
be proved to establish a violation of the UTPA, the court relied
on interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC
Act)102 by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and federal
98. 280 S.C. at 524, 313 S.E.2d at 337.
99. Id.
100. The court noted with disapproval the voluminous record of this case: a three-
volume transcript of over 1200 pages and 155 exceptions to the circuit court's order. The
court found the facts and issues of the case "few and fairly straightforward" despite the
"lengthy and unduly repetitious" arguments concerning the exceptions. Id. at 523, 313
S.E.2d at 337. The court chastized both sides for creating "a great deal of unnecessary
work for the Court": C & L, by improperly raising exceptions; the Attorney General, by
making general objections rather than specific ones. Id. at 526, n.2, 313 S.E.2d at 339 n.2.
101. Id. at 528, 313 S.E.2d at 338. The court quickly dispensed with C & L's argu-
ment that it was not liable on an agency theory because Wayne Cooper was an indepen-
dent contractor. The court noted that "independent contractor" and "agent" are not
necessarily mutually exclusive terms. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 2(3)(1958).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)(1976). S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(a)(1976), the basic provi-
sion of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, is identical to § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, giving rise to the nickname "the Little FTC Act." Under the
original FTC Act, enacted in 1914, courts required two components to establish a viola-
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courts. 10 3 An early Supreme Court definition of unfair or decep-
tive practices under the FTC Act dismissed the necessity of
proving the elements of ordinary fraud."' Intent to deceive is
not required; rather, the mere capacity or effect or tendency to
deceive may sufficiently establish a violation.0 " State courts in
other jurisdictions have also differentiated between proof of
common-law fraud and proof of unfair trade practices:106 "Proof
of fraud would necessarily constitute a violation of the prohibi-
tion against unfair and deceptive acts; however, the converse is
not always true.
1 07
Thus, the determination that unfair trade practices are not
confined to conduct actionable at common law aligns South Car-
olina with many states that have followed the interpretations of
the FTC Act by the FTC and federal courts.108 The false induce-
ments offered by C & L's salesmen might easily fall into one of
the categories previously defined by other states as unfair, in-
cluding making misrepresentations as to the condition of goods
offered for sale 09 and failures or refusals to do particular acts.110
tion: (1) that false or misleading advertising practices were likely to cause injury to the
public; and (2) the likelihood of injury to a competitor of the misleading advertiser. The
Wheeler-Lea Amendment, added in 1938, shifted the emphasis of the FTC Act from
competition to public interest. See Annot., 65 A.L.R.2D 225, 234 (1959).
103. The Act mandates using this guidance. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(b)(1976)
which reads as follows: "It is the intent of the legislature that in construing paragraph
(a) of this section the courts will be guided by the interpretations given by the Federal
Trade Commission and the Federal Courts to § 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), as from time to time amended."
104. See, e.g., FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 81 (1934), in which the
Court held: "Competition may be unfair within the meaning of this statute and within
the scope of the discretionary powers conferred on the Commission, though the practice
condemned does not amount to fraud as understood in courts of law." See generally
Day, supra note 92.
105. FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 81 (1934).
106. See Heller v. Silverbranch Const. Corp., 376 Mass. 621, 382 N.E.2d 1065 (1978);
Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975).
107. 288 N.C. at 309, 218 S.E.2d at 346.
108. See Annot., 89 A.L.R.3D 449 (1979).
109. See, e.g., 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975)(car salesman's-false representa-
tions that a used automobile had one previous owner, when in fact it had two, and that
the car was in good condition, when in fact it had been wrecked, violated the North
Carolina unfair trade practices statute).
110. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Mobley, 555 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977)(builders
were liable for violating the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
by failing to install uniform carpeting after representing to the purchasers of the house
that they would do so).
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In negating the need for proving common-law fraud, the court
left an unanswered question: exactly what elements need to be
proved to establish a violation of the UTPA? Clearly, proving an
unfair act is a more flexible process than proving a fraudulent
one. The court did not provide a list of necessary elements of
"unfairness" as it has done for fraud. At this point, no exact
formula exists by which one can subtract fraudulent components
to reach the conclusion of an unfair act.
In its consideration of the summary judgment issue dis-
missing Funderburk and W. L. Cooper, the court employed the
"controlling person doctrine." The court determined that the
UTPA authorizes the Attorney General to bring an action
against a "person,""' which the court interpreted to include the
controlling persons of a corporation."2 The court found that the
roles of Funderburk and W. L. Cooper, as officers and sole
shareholders of C & L, sufficiently created an inference that they
were its controlling persons. If this inference proved true, the
court reasoned, the controlling person doctrine"113 would extend
liability both to the corporation, C & L, and to its controlling
persons, Funderburk and W. L. Cooper. Thus, the court asserted
that summary judgment dismissing these men would be
improper.
In invoking the controlling person doctrine, the court again
turned to cases considering violations of the FTC Act. In FTC v.
Standard Education Society" 4 the United States Supreme
Court, employing a two-step process, logically extended liability
for corporate violations of the FTC Act to individuals. First, the
Court found that the FTC Act gave the Commission power to
prevent persons as well as partnerships and corporations from
using unfair methods." 5 Second, the individuals involved were
111. "Person" includes "natural persons, corporations, trusts, partnerships, incorpo-
rated or unincorporated associates and any other legal entity." S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-10
(1976).
112. 280 S.C. at 530, 313 S.E.2d at 341. For definition of a controlling person, see
supra note 94.
113. In its discussion of the controlling person doctrine, the court cited the following
authorities: FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937); Sunshine Art Studios,
Inc. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 1171, 1175 (1st Cir. 1973); Benrus Watch Co. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 313,
325 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 939 (1966); Consumer Sales Corp. v. FTC, 198
F.2d 404, 407-08 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 912 (1953).
114. 302 U.S. 112 (1937).
115. Id. at 119.
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managers and sole stockholders of the corporation, acting with
the same freedom as if no corporation existed. The Court rea-
soned that since "so far as corporate action was concerned, these
three were the actors,"' 6 the Commission was justified in in-
cluding them individually in its order. The South Carolina Court
of Appeals followed the same rationale in the present case.
In imposing liability on individuals for their corporation's
unfair trade practices, courts primarily rely on the control these
individuals exercise over the business. The need for some degree
of actual culpability by the controlling person, however, was em-
phasized in Consumer Sales Corp. v. FTC."' In this case Julius
J. Blumenfeld and Myron J. Colin were sole shareholders and
officers of Consumer Sales Corp., which sold products through
door-to-door salesmen. These salesmen falsely represented to
potential customers that they could get a special low price by
sending in a certain number of box tops from specified soap
manufacturers' products. The corporation furnished the sales-
men with order blanks entitled "Special Offer" for this promo-
tion. The special price, however, was the same as the regular of-
fer. Although Blumenfeld and Colin claimed that they could not
be held responsible for misrepresentations by salesmen who
were independent contractors, the Commission equated the cor-
poration's act of supplying the order forms with the controlling
persons' active encouragement of and participation in making
false representations.'I s Generally, the courts focus on control by
the persons, inferring liability through the rationale that liability
must fall somewhere, and the logical place is with those in
control.
Both in its expansive interpretation of "unfair trade prac-
tices" violative of the UTPA and its extension of the controlling
person doctrine to liability under the UTPA, the court has
heightened consumer protection. Potentially, the lessened re-
quirements for proving unfair practices could require "the strict-
116. Id. at 120.
117. 198 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1952).
118. Id. at 407. The Court noted, however, that Blumenfeld "was included not be-
cause he was still an officer or stockholder of the offending corporation but because he
himself had participated in the use of unfair and deceptive acts or practices in com-
merce." Id. at 408. This statement may merely emphasize the involvement of this partic-
ular individual since he resigned his office and disposed of his stock before the Commis-
sioner's order was entered.
[Vol. 37
22
South Carolina aw Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol37/iss1/5
BUSINESS LAW
est honesty in commercial dealings."' 9 If South Carolina courts
continue to follow FTC precedent, a violation of the UTPA may
occur when the mere capacity to deceive has been proved. Simi-
larly, approval of the controlling person doctrine indicates that
personal liability for corporate violations may be considered
whenever clear domination of a corporation is evident. Through
approval of the controlling person doctrine as a means of estab-
lishing liability under the UTPA, the court sharpens yet another
sword with which to pierce the corporate veil,120 consequently
increasing the vulnerability of the individuals behind the corpo-
rate entity. The strength of the consumer's shield raised in this
case will not be fully appreciated until the exact nature of an
"unfair act" and the necessary characteristics of a "controlling
person" are further defined.
Lisa D. Hyman
119. Day, supra note 92, at 486.
120. Typically, piercing the corporate veil of limited liability to reach the individu-
als responsible for corporate obligations requires that those individuals have used the
corporation for personal ends. Factors pointing to this manipulation of the corporate
entity include gross undercapitalization and disregard of corporate formalities. See De-
Witt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976); Bruns-
wick Corp. v. Waxman, 459 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). The use of the controlling
person doctrine, however, seems to be triggered simply by the extent of control the indi-
vidual exercises over the corporation. In the cases employing the controlling person doc-
trine to hold individuals liable for violations of unfair trade practices acts, the courts do
not assert that the corporations are mere shams.
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